Povzetek: Prispevek obravnava cenovne škarje kot obliko zlorabe prevladujočega položaja. Osredotoča se na pojav povsem različne obravnave cenovnih škarij v sodni praksi Zveznega vrhovnega sodišča ZDA in Sodišča EU. Ob primerljivi pravni podlagi skoraj enake dejanske stanove cenovnih škarij Zvezno vrhovno sodišče ZDA obravnava kot dovoljeno tekmovanje na račun učinkovitosti, Sodišče EU pa kot izključevalno zlorabo prevladujočega položaja. Paradoks prepovedi cenovnih škarij, ki je v tem, da njihova prepoved zvišuje cene proizvodov in storitev na relevantnem trgu in tako bolj koristi konkurentom kot potrošnikom, razkriva, da gre razlog za različno obravnavo cenovnih škarij iskati v različnih ciljih in varovanih dobrinah konkurenčnega prava v EU in v ZDA. Medtem ko antitrust v ZDA prepoveduje le tista izključevalna ravnanja, ki škodujejo blaginji potrošnikov, Evropska komisija in Sodišče EU 102. člen Pogodbe o delovanju EU razlagata na način, da prepoveduje tudi nekatera omejevalna ravnanja, ki škodujejo le blaginji konkurentov. S tem v konkurenčno pravo EU vpletata koncepte prava reguliranih sektorjev, katerih namen je nižanje vstopnih ovir novim podjetjem za vstop na trg. Namen prispevka je prikazati, da s prepovedjo cenovnih škarij Evropska komisija in Sodišče EU to počneta na škodo blaginje potrošnikov in grobo posegata v pravno varnost podjetij s prevladujočim položajem.
Ključne besede: cenovne škarje, zloraba prevladujočega položaja, vertikalna integracija, pravna varnost, imputacijski test, test enako učinkovitega konkurenta, blaginja potrošnikov, zavrnitev dobave, telekomunikacije, regulirani sektorji
Title: Margin Squeeze as an Indicator of Different Objectives of Antitrust Law in the US and in the EU
Abstract: This paper analyses diametrically diverging approaches to margin squeeze in the latest case law of the Supreme Court of the US and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). Even though they were applying very similar provisions on abusive unilateral conduct and deciding cases with almost the same factual background, the CJEU repeatedly held that the margin squeeze is a type of abuse of dominant position, while the Supreme Court of the US clearly considered it as competition on merits. The main paradox of these cases is that the banning of margin squeeze most likely leads to higher prices for consumers on the downstream market, and is therefore much more beneficial to competitors than to consumers. Since a ban of margin squeeze promotes the welfare of competitors to the detriment of the consumers'' welfare, it is clear that the decision whether or not to ban it in fact implies a political decision as to whose welfare shall the competition law aim to protect. The fact that the two most developed antitrust legal systems deal with this phenomenon differently indicates different objectives of competition law in both legal systems. While the antitrust law in the US forbids only exclusionary conduct that is detrimental to consumers'' welfare, the European Commission and the CJEU interpret Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) in a way that it also prohibits exclusionary conduct that is detrimental solely to the welfare of competitors. With such interpretation, concepts of ex ante market regulation, which aim to lower the entry barriers to internal market, are being introduced to EU competition law. The latest case law of the CJEU on margin squeeze clearly shows that such "regulatory" interpretation of Article 102 TFEU interferes with the basic principle of legal certainty and reduces the consumers'' welfare.
Keywords: margin squeeze, abuse of dominant position, vertical integration, legal certainty, imputation test, equally efficient competitor test, consumer welfare, refusal to deal, telecommunications, regulated markets
