Povzetek: Prispevek se osredotoča na institut delne prostovoljne prevzemne ponudbe, ki so jo posamezne države implementirale v prevzemno zakonodajo, nekatere pod določenimi pogoji, druge pa prepovedale. S tega stališča je najprej obravnavan Zakon o prevzemih (ZPre-1), ki se je po zadnji svetovni gospodarski krizi velikokrat spremenil. Spremembe so poskušale preprečiti izčrpavanje ciljnih družb pred prevzemniki, ki so jih prevzemali zaradi lastnih interesov, in ne interesov drugih. Bolj konkretne spremembe in dopolnitve je prinesla šele novela ZPre-1G iz leta 2015. Avtorja zagovarjata tezo, da so v ZPre-1 mogoče izboljšave, s katerimi bodo manjšinski delničarji in upniki lahko še bolj zaščiteni ter bo preprečeno izčrpavanje ciljne družbe. ZPre-1 opredeljuje instituta obvezne in prostovoljne prevzemne ponudbe, ne pozna pa niti delne obvezne niti delne prostovoljne ponudbe. O uvedbi delne prostovoljne ponudbe, pri čemer prevzemnik ne pridobi kontrolnega deleža v ciljni družbi ali kadar je z zakonom omejeno pridobivanje deležev družb ali so pri tem zahtevana še soglasja različnih organov, se je v preteklosti že pisalo, vendar delna ponudba v ZPre-1 ni bila implementirana. V nadaljevanju so predstavljene nekatere tuje prevzemne zakonodaje, in sicer v Združenih državah Amerike (ZDA), Združenem kraljestvu in na Nizozemskem, ki delne ponudbe poznajo, vendar jih uporabljajo na različne načine, za njih pa veljajo različni pogoji. Tem ureditvam je skupno, da je pri delnih ponudbah treba upoštevati načelo sorazmernosti nakupa delnic od vseh delničarjev, ki so delnice ciljne družbe pripravljeni prodati. Na koncu prispevka bomo predstavili še različne poglede in mnenja avtorjev glede instituta obvezne in delne prevzemne ponudbe.

Ključne besede: Zakon o prevzemih, prevzemna ponudba, delna prevzemna ponudba, manjšinski delničar, prevzemnik

Title: Application of the Partial Offer Concept, as Stipulated in the Takeover Act

Abstract: The paper focuses on the institute of partial voluntary takeover bid, which some states have implemented in their M&A legislation, others implemented under specific conditions, and some outright banned. From this perspective, we begin by discussing the Takeovers Act (ZPre-1), which has seen a number of amendments in the wake of the most recent economic crisis. Changes tried to prevent leeching of target companies by transferees acquiring companies to serve their own interests rather than acting in the interest of others. More concrete changes were introduced by the 2015 amendment, the ZPre-1G. The authors argue that there is still room for improvement in ZPre-1, which could further protect minority shareholders, creditors, and prevent attrition of target companies. ZPre-1 defines the concepts of mandatory and voluntary takeover bid; however, it mentions neither a partial mandatory nor a partial voluntary bid. While there was some public discussion on the introduction of a partial voluntary offer in the past, where the transferee does not acquire a controlling interest in the target company, or where there are statutory limitations regarding acquisition of equity holdings in companies, or in some cases various bodies' consents are required, the partial offer institute was not implemented in the ZPre-1. The paper goes on to examine examples of some international takeover legislations, specifically that of the USA, UK and the Netherlands, where partial offers are implemented but used in different ways and under different conditions. What these countries have in common is that in the case of partial offers, the principle of proportionality of purchase of shares from all shareholders willing to sell their shares is observed. At the end of the paper, we also present the authors' various views and opinions regarding the institute of mandatory and partial takeover offer.

Keywords: Takeovers Act, takeover bid, partial tender offer, minority shareholder, acquirer